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This paper studies the effects of the electoral systems on the size of government expenditure in consumption in the 
Italian regions. It analyses how public spending is affected by the degree of proportionality of the electoral system and by 
the change in the corruption trend after 1993, when the Italian electoral system switched from proportional to 
majoritarian and when ”mani pulite”, a campaign against corruption that changed the increasing corruption trend, starts. 
The rate of growth of public spending in consumption is linked to the rate of growth of concentration of votes in the 
hands of political parties in different way depending on electoral system: under proportional system the relation among 
them is positive, under majoritarian electoral system it becomes negative. About corruption it is not possible to make a 
precise guess; referring to the items composing public spending in consumption, the relation is negative because those are 
sectors in which it is difficult to collect bribes and maintain them secrets.  
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Looking across the countries of the world, and, in particular, looking across
the Italian regions, one can observe a wide variation in the size of govern-
ment, in term of government spending in diﬀerent items. Following the
economic theory, diﬀerent political institutions, as electoral rules (majori-
tarian and proportional) and regime types (presidential and parliamentary),
aﬀect the size and the composition of government expenditure.
In this paper we study, empirically, the eﬀects of the electoral systems on
the size of government expenditure in the Italian regions. In particular, we
are interested in analysing how public spending is aﬀected by the degree of
proportionality of the electoral system and by the change in the corruption
trend after 1993, two topics which have characterized the italian scenario at
l e a s ti nt h el a s t st w e n t yy e a r s .
In Italy since 1993 the electoral system switched from proportional to
majoritarian. The majoritarian electoral system is characterized by a small
number of districts and the winner of the elections is the candidate who gets
more votes in the district (typically one candidate is elected in each district);
this electoral rule does not guarantee the representative of the minority. The
proportional system has large districts with many candidates, and voters
vote for a list of candidates drawn up by political parties, without expressing
a preference for any particular candidate; the number of candidates elected
in each list is proportional to the votes received by the list; this system
guarantees the presence in the Parliament of a plurality of political parties.
In Italy the referendum of 1993 changed the electoral rules, introducing
the majoritarian system; the new Italian electoral system is not completely
majoritarian but it is an intermediate case (mixed electoral system). For
the ”Senate” (upper chamber), the 3
4 of the 315 seats are assigned using the
majoritarian criterion and the other 1
4 using the proportional criterion. For
the ”Chamber of Deputies” (lower chamber), the 630 seats are distributed
in 26 electoral districts; in each district, the 75% of the seats are assigned by
majoritarian and the resulting 25% by proportional. This mixed electoral
system permits the minority to preserve the representation in the Parliament
and to have a ”blackmail power”1.
Comparing the two electoral systems, we can say that proportional sys-
tems guarantee the representation of the political minority, but they lead
to an instability of governments (and ineﬃciency of them) due to a politi-
1Before the referendum in 1993 the elections of the representatives to the Chamber of
Deputies was managed by law 30 March 1957 n. 361 which introduced a pure proportional
system. For the elections to the Senate the law 6 February 1948 n. 28 initiated a mixed
electoral system where just one candidate was presented in each, and it was elected only
if he reached at least the 65\% of votes. If no candidate was elected the seats were
distributed using proportional criteria. In a very few cases candidates reached the 65\%
of preferences, then the elections to the Senate was pure proportional
2cal fragmentation, and the relative creation, after the elections, of coalition
among political parties with diﬀerent goals.
On the other side, majoritarian electoral systems do not guarantee the
representative of the minority in the Parliament, but they promote the cre-
ation of political parties’ coalitions, to win the elections, with a common
(unique) program.
Political equilibria typically exhibit two political failures: public goods
are under-provided and politicians earn positive rents for themselves at the
voters expense. Public goods are under-provided because politicians neglect
the interest of some voters and they only need to please powerful groups
of voters to win the elections addressing redistributive transfers to those
groups. Politicians earn rents because, once in oﬃce, they enjoy consid-
erable discretion. These political failures depend on political institutions.
The electoral rules determine the scope and the intensity of the political
competition. Generally, electoral regimes which promote more intense com-
petition, imply policy choices which internalises beneﬁts and costs of fewer
voters, providing less public good but small rent for politicians.
T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1999) present a model of preelection politics
in which they explain how election rules (majoritarian and proportional
elections) aﬀect ﬁscal policy; the authors show that majoritarian elections
concentrate electoral competition in some key marginal districts, consisting
in more mobile voters, in the sense of being more responsive to economic
beneﬁts, resulting in increased targeted redistribution toward a narrower
constituency, because politicians try to please swing voters in the marginal
districts rather than swing voters in the population as a whole; whereas
in the proportional elections politician needs to please a large number of
voters to win the elections, then politician has a strong incentive to provide
broad beneﬁts to many voters, through public goods or broad redistributive
programs.
The following analysis uses Italian regional data on public expenditure
to test how the degree of proportionality of the electoral system aﬀected
the Italian public spending. Figure 1 shows the italian public spending in
consumption and GDP from 1980 to 2000.
Figure 2 shows the variation in Italian public spending in consumption
over GDP from 1980 to 2000.
We can see that starting from 1993 there has been a reduction in public
spending over GDP. The possible causes of this shape of the Italian public
spending trend could be: the introduction of the majoritarian system; the
”mani pulite”, a campaign against corruption, started in1993, that changed
the corruption increasing trend2; the admittance of Italy in the European
Union (and the necessary reduction of both the ratio debt/GDP and the
2S e eD e lM o n t eA . ,P a p a g n iE .” T h eD e t e r m i nation of Corruption in Italy: A Regional
Panel Data Analysis” mimeo, University of Naples Federico II, 2004.
3Figure 1: Italian public spending in consumption and GDP from 1980 to
2000
Figure 2: Italian public spending in consumption over GDP from 1980 to
2000
4inﬂation). See the second point: corruption of politicians can aﬀect public
spending. Theoretically, T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1999) say that ma-
joritarian system is associated with small rent (corruption) for politicians:
electoral competition is stiﬀer in this electoral regime because candidate try
to please swing voters just in the marginal districts rather than swing voters
in the entire population and this leads to a reduction of the equilibrium rent
for politicians.
The empirical paper of Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2002) suggests
that countries where voters vote for a party list have much more widespread
corruption compared to countries where voters choose an individual candi-
date. Then, majoritarian system is associated with less corruption. This is
the reason why, in Italy, by the referendum of 1993, the majoritarian elec-
toral system has been introduced, as a way to reduce the corruption habits
of the past.
In Italy there is not empirical evidence on how electoral system aﬀects
public spending. We expect that the change in the electoral system in Italy
changed the size of government expenditure. To explain the variation in the
Italian regional public spending, we concentrate the attention on the change
in the electoral rules and the corruption; indeed, the change in the electoral
system together with ”mani pulite” have been introduced in Italy in the
same period and (maybe) they both aﬀected the political decision about
regional public spending. For this reason, the Italian case is a particular
one in the European scenario. To verify the hypothesis, we introduce in
the regression equation, as explanatory variable, a measure of the degree
of proportionality of the electoral system by constructing a concentration
index of votes of political parties in the elections: more concentration of
votes means more majoritarian systems. We also investigate the impact of
the corruption on the size of government spending, related to the change
in the electoral system. We want to see if and how ”mani pulite” changed
the destination of resources (in the form of public spending) from central
government to regions; it is not possible to make a precise guess on it.
The prediction is that corruption is higher in markets where the degree of
competition is low, and that corrupt politicians will choose goods whose
exact value is diﬃcult to monitor.
Two analysis are made. We use a panel of the 20 Italian regions over
21 years (1980-2000); the dependent variable is the rate of growth of the
aggregate Italian regional public expenditure in consumption in percentage
of GDP. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of the rate of growth of the concen-
tration index is positive until 1992 and negative from 1993 to 2000, that
is, more majoritarian system is associated with smaller public spending (as
predicted). To measure the corruption we used the number of corruption
crimes reported to the police; the sign of the rate of growth of the per capita
corruption crimes we ﬁnd is negative.
We considered, later, some items of public spending, as health, edu-
5cation and social services and securities. The panel we dispose is a more
restricted one, from 1980 to 1995, then the analysis involves only the Italian
proportional electoral system.
2 The literature
We summarize some empirical contributions to the literature about the ef-
fects of electoral systems.
G.M. Milesi-Ferretti, R. Perotti, M. Ristagno (2002) study the eﬀects
of electoral systems on the size and the composition of public expenditure
in OECD countries. They deﬁne the degree of ”territorial inclusiveness”
of the electoral system as the strength of the link between representative
and geographically localized interest (that is, the degree to which repre-
sentatives are elected on a local rather than national basis), and they are
interested in studying whether it aﬀects the size and the composition of
government spending. The ﬁrst hypothesis is that, if the electoral districts
are very large, politicians may be more likely to seek support by targeting
groups by using government transfers; in contrast, for politicians with small
geographical constituencies, public investment may be an eﬀective way to
transfer resources to their electors. The second hypothesis is that propor-
tional systems lead to higher overall expenditure than majoritarian ones.
They measure the degree of proportionality of the electoral system by using
the district magnitude (the average number of representatives elected per
district); moreover, to measure the district magnitude, they use the ”eﬀec-
tive district magnitude” (deﬁned as the ratio of the number of assembly
seats to the number of districts) or the ”eﬀective thresholds” (deﬁned as
the percentage of votes which a party needs to win in order to gain repre-
sentation in Parliament); these measures of proportionality of the electoral
system are inversely related to the degree of territorial inclusiveness. They
ﬁnd, in a cross-section of 20 OECD countries, strong evidence that more
proportional systems have larger government expenditure (as measured by
the ratio of general government expenditure to GDP), disaggregated into
transfers, wage government consumption, non-wage government consump-
tion and government investment.
The paper of P. Mauro (1998) provides the ﬁrst cross-country evidence
that corruption aﬀects the composition of government expenditure; in par-
ticular, education spending is adversely aﬀected by corruption because it
seems to be an area where it is relatively diﬃcult to levy bribes. There are
more public goods - high-technology goods produced by a limited number
of oligopolistic ﬁrms (for example, international trade in military aircraft) -
that are particularly susceptible to corruption; in contrast, some other goods
(as basic education), are not. For other kinds of spending, as health, trans-
fers and welfare payments, it is not always possible to make a precise guess
6on how corruption aﬀects a particular spending item. Mauro uses corruption
indices produced by a private ﬁrm (Political Risk Services, Inc.) for a cross-
section of countries. It ﬁnds that more corrupt countries choose to spend
less in education, since it does not provide as many lucrative opportunities
for government oﬃcials as other components of spending do. He uses the
1970-85 average of government spending on defence, education, transfers,
social security and welfare, and total government consumption spending (in
percent of GDP) for over 100 countries. He shows that this result is robust
to a number of changes in the speciﬁcation; the result is then consistent
with the hypothesis that education provides more limited opportunities for
rent-seeking than other item do.
The size of government spending is also inﬂuenced by the electoral cycle:
as the election date approaches, the incentives for politicians to perform
well become stronger. Often it is possible to increase government spending
just ahead of the elections, while postponing the moment when taxes are
raised to pay for it. This electoral cycle in government spending creates the
appearance of good performance in the eyes of voters. The T. Persson and G.
Tabellini paper (2003) investigates how electoral cycles vary across political
systems, that is, how we expect electoral cycles in ﬁscal policy vary with
electoral rules and form of government. The model of opportunistic electoral
cycles and the model of accountability predict that taxes are cut before
elections, but their prediction about spending diﬀer: models emphasizing
reputation building by oﬃce-seeking politicians (Rogoﬀ K. (1990)) predict
that spending is raised, whereas models emphasizing electoral accountability
of rent-seeking politicians (Besley T., Case A. (1995)) instead predict that
wasteful (for voters) spending is cut.
In the political science the common idea is that majoritarian elections
are associated with stronger accountability than proportional elections. T.
Persson and G. Tabellini (2000) consider a career-concern model of pol-
icy making, where wasteful spending is smaller in majoritarian systems
with small districts and plurality rules, where politicians are individually
accountable to the voters, than in proportional elections, where they are
collectively accountable via party lists. Furthermore, proportional elections
induce politicians to seek support from larger groups in the electorate, then
is plausible to expect a stronger expansion of broad programs around elec-
tions under proportional electoral rules than under majoritarian electoral
rules. To test the idea that ﬁscal policy variables display systematic pat-
terns in the vicinity of the elections and that such electoral cycles diﬀer
among political systems, the authors used annual data for 60 countries over
40 years (1960-1998). They used four ﬁscal policy instruments: central gov-
ernment’s overall expenditure, revenues, budget surplus and total outlays on
broad welfare state programs (like pensions and unemployment insurance),
all scaled to GDP and express as percentage. Electoral rules and forms
of government are classiﬁed by using dummy variables: MAJ which takes
7value 1 for majoritarian countries and 0 for mixed and proportional electoral
systems; PRES which takes the value 1 for presidential countries and 0 for
parliamentary countries. For the electoral cycle, they used a dummy vari-
able, ELEX, that takes the value 1 in the year of elections and 0 in all other
year; they studied ﬁscal policy behaviour both before and after elections by
using the one year lags of the election dates. The panel data estimation
with ﬁxed eﬀects showed that only countries with majoritarian elections cut
spending during election years, and cut taxes more than countries with pro-
portional elections; only proportional democracies raises welfare spending
before elections; only presidential regimes postpone unpopular ﬁscal policy
adjustments until after the elections.
3T h e D a t a
The data we used in this paper comes from the ISTAT database. The ﬁrst
set of regressions (Table 2) comprises annual data for the 20 Italian regions
over 21 years (1980 - 2000). The dependent variable is the regional govern-
ment expenditure in consumption, which includes expenditure in defence,
education, health, general and economic services, social services and secu-
rity, unemployment insurance, house. This variable is scaled to GDP and
expressed as percentage. We used the values at constant prices (1995). The
second set of regressions (Tables 3, 4, 5) comprises annual data for the 20
Italian regions over 16 years (1980 - 1995). For regressions in Table 3 the
dependent variable is the regional government expenditure in health, scaled
to GDP and expressed as percentage; for regressions in Table 4 the depen-
dent variable is the regional government expenditure in education, scaled
to GDP and expressed as percentage; for regressions in Table 5 the depen-
dent variable is the regional government expenditure in social services and
security, scaled to GDP and expressed as percentage.
For both sets of regressions we control for the log of the per capita GDP
and we use a dummy variable MAG to capture the variation of the rate of
growth of public spending in consumption after 1993 due to the change in
the electoral system (from proportional to majoritarian), due to the eﬀects
of the Italian government economic policies of the reduction of both the ratio
debt/GDP and the inﬂation rate to enter the European Union in 1993, and
due to the eﬀects of the ”mani pulite”. The variable MAG takes the value
0 from 1980 to 1992 and the value 1 from 1993 to 2000.
After the referendum of 1993 in Italy, the electoral system did not be-
come totally majoritarian (and before 1993 it were not totally proportional);
to measure the degree of proportionality of the Italian electoral system (and
then, to investigate the eﬀects of electoral rules on public spending in con-
sumption), we used the Herﬁndal concentration index of votes of the Italian
political parties in the election of ”Senate”. That is, we take the percent-
8age of votes of every political party in each election (S) from 1980 to 2000
(precisely, the votes in the election of 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1996)
and we constructed the Herﬁndal index as H =
S
S2; we called this variable
CONC. We expect that under majoritarian system this index is greater than
under proportional election, because, by deﬁnition, in the majoritarian sys-
tems a party, to win the election, has to collect the majority of votes; then,
votes are concentrated in the hands of few political parties. The prevision
of T. Persson and G. Tabellini model (2000) is that majoritarian elections
are associated with lower public expenditure than proportional ones.
Figure 3 shows the concentration index in Italy in the period 1980-2000.
Figure 3: Concentration index of votes of political parties in the elections
from 1980 to 2000 in Italy
After 1993 votes are concentrated in the hands of a few political parties
with respect to the previous electoral regimes.
We have introduced in the regression equation another variable, CORR,
the rate of growth of the number of crimes against public administration
reported to the police for each of the 20 Italian regions in the period speciﬁed
above, per capita3.
In estimating the relationship between corruption crimes and government
espenditure is unlikely to be an endogeneity bias because the values are
subjective. Moreover, government spending is proposed as a share of GDP
because, if bribes could be levied on all income, then gevernment expenditure
as a share of GDP should be unrelated to corruption4.
From the initial panel estimation emerged the suspicion of a unit root.
Following the procedure of Im et al.’ paper (2000) (which proposes a unit
root test for dynamic heterogeneous panel), we make a test for unit root in
3See Del Monte A., Papagni E. (2004).
4P. Mauro (1998).
9panel. For each Italian region we estimate the time series model
∆yi,t = αi + βiyi,t−1 + γi,t−1∆yi,t−1 (1)
∆yi,t = αi + βiyi,t−1 + γi,t−1∆yi,t−1 + δit (2)
∀i =1 ....n
where yi,t is the logarithm of the government expenditure in consumption
of region i at time t. Equation (1) is the ADF equation without trend and
equation (2) is the ADF equation with trend. The test is based on the
estimation of equation (1) and (2) on the time series of each region. The
null hypothesis of unit root is
H0 : βi =0 , for all i.
The alternative hypothesis is
H1 : βi < 0, for all i =1 ,2,....N1;
βi =0 ,i = N1 +1 ,N 1 +2 ,....N.
Under the alternative hypothesis is not necessary that all values of βi be
negative, but some series may contain a unit root.
The test statistic proposed by Im et al. is based on Student’s t-test
















i=1 ti,T is the average of t-statistic for testing βi =
0 in the equation (1) and (2) on the data of each region, E(
−
tT) and VA R (
−
tT)
are respectively the mean and the variance of ti,T obtained by simulation
and presented in the appendix of the paper of Im et al. The Zt−bar is
asymptotically distributed like an N(0,1). The critical value at 5% is -
1.645: the null hypothesis of unit root is not rejected when the value of the
Zt−bar is greater than -1.645.
See Table 1.
Table 1. Panel unit root test
N =2 0 T =2 1
E(
−





tT)(without trend)=0 ,915 VA R (
−
tT)(with trend)=0 ,845
Zt−bar(without trend)=4 ,15 Zt−bar(with trend)= −0,894
It is evident that we accept the null hypothesis of unit root.
104E c o n o m e t r i c s p e c i ﬁcation and results
We estimate the following equation
∆yi,t = αi + βi∆GDPi,t + γi,tMAG+ δi,t∆CONCi,t−1 + (3)
+λi,t∆CORRi,t+1 + σi,t [∆CONCi,t−1]
2 +
+θi,tMAG∗ ∆CONCi,t−1 + τi,tMAG∗ ∆CORRi,t+1 + εi,t
yi,t is the logarithm of the government expenditure in consumption (scaled
to GDP and expressed as percentage) of region i at time t,t h e n∆yi,t is the
rate of growth of the government expenditure in consumption of region i at
time t; GDPi,t is the logarithm of the per capita GDP of region i at time
t,t h e n∆GDPi,t i st h er a t eo fg r o w t ho ft h ep e rc a p i t aGDP of region i
at time t; CONCi,t−1 is the logarithm of the concentration index of votes
gained by political parties in the elections in region i at time t − 1,t h e n
∆CONCi,t−1 is the rate of growth of the concentration of votes gained by
political parties in the elections in region i at time t−1.W et a k et h ev a l u e
of this variable at time t−1 because the policy implemented by the winners
of the elections gives its eﬀects at least one year later. MAG is a dummy
variable that takes the value 0 from 1980 to 1992 and 1 from 1993 to 2000.
CORRi,t+1 is the logarithm of per capita corruption crimes reported to the
police of region i at time t+1;t h e n∆CORRi,t+1 i st h er a t eo fg r o w t ho ft h e
per capita corruption crimes reported to the police of region i at time t+1.
We take the value at t+1because the corruption crimes registrated by police
refer to those committed at least one year before. MAG∗∆CONCi,t−1 and
MAG∗ ∆CORRi,t+1 are two interaction variables to investigate, the ﬁrst
one, the change in the relation between the rate of growth of concentration
of votes in the Senate election and the rate of growth of regional public
spending in consumption, and, the second one, the change in the relation
between the rate of growth of per capita corruption and the same dependent
variable, both before and after 1993. The constant term αi includes all that
is not speciﬁed in the model and that can aﬀects public spending, as some
causes of ineﬃciency of the bureaucracy.
Table 2 shows the results of the regressions. In every regressions the
sign of the ∆GDPi,t is negative, that is, government addresses more spend-
ing to regions where the rate of growth of the per capita GDP is lower, as
expected; this variable is signiﬁcant. From equation (3) and (4) we notice
that there is a break in the relation between the concentration of votes and
regional public spending in consumption: the variable MAG∗∆CONCi,t−1
is signiﬁcant. Before 1993 (then, under proportional system) regions where
the rate of growth of concentration of votes increased, the rate growth of
public spending in consumption also increased; after 1993, and then under
majoritarian electoral system, this relation inverted. Before the referendum
11the concentration of votes in the hands of the political parties was very low
because of the proportional electoral system, leading to a political fragmen-
tation and the need of coalitions among parties with diﬀerent goals. The
consequence was an instability of government. In proportional systems if the
concentration of votes slightly increases, government becomes more eﬃcient
(because there is less political fragmentation and no need to create govern-
ment coalitions): it is less instable, and public spending could increases, as
a consequence. Under majoritarian system, in 1993, the impact of the rate
of growth of concentration of votes on the rate growth of public spending
in consumption becomes negative, as economic theory predicts: politicians
don’t seek support from larger groups in the electorate but just in some
marginal districts; public spending is under-provided5.
The coeﬃcient of the dummy variable MAGis negative and highly signif-
icant. As said before this variable wants to capture the eﬀects of some factors
on the size of Italian government regional spending, as the economic policies
to enter EU, the campaign against corruption ”mani pulite”, the change in
the electoral system. These factors weighed negatively upon regional public
spending, ﬁrst of all, the government economic policies to reduce both the
ratio debt/GDP and the inﬂation rate.
When we study the eﬀect of corruption on public spending, we can expect
positive and negative sign of the regressors (as said in the introduction);
∆CORRi,t+1 is negative in every regression: regions with a higher rate
of growth of per capita corruption have a lower rate of growth of public
consumption. This sign is justiﬁed by the nature of the items composing
”public spending in consumption” that we used as dependent variable; it
includes, in means, those items in which is diﬃcult to collect bribes for
public oﬃcials. In Italy the items more susceptible of corruption are public
works, not included in the dependent variable.
In equation (6) we introduce the interaction variable MAG∗∆CORRi,t+1
to detect the change in the relation between corruption and regional public
spending. This variable is not signiﬁcant meaning that there was not struc-
tural break, or not variation in the relation between the rate of growth of
the per capita corruption and the rate of growth of public spending before
and after 1993.
Now we start the analysis of the second set of regressions.
As said before, the aggregate government regional expenditure in con-
sumption includes expenditure in defence, education, health, general and
economic services, social services and securities, unemployment insurance,
5In Italy, at least until 2000, regional public spending in consumption (for the items
included in the dependent variable) is decided by the government and not by the regions.
Then, it is decides at central level. But the opposition coalitions have always had a central
role in driving these decisions, so, in regions where the votes are concentrated in the hand
of the oppositions, public spending decisions are inﬂuenced by the political ideology of
those opposition coalitions.
12house. For the second set of regressions we take three of these voices, health,
education and social services and securities to investigate the eﬀects of the
electoral systems and the corruption on consumption government expen-
diture in the Italian regions. For these three items we dispose of a more
restricted panel, from 1980 to 1995; these data, then, refer to public spend-
ing under the Italian proportional electoral system the most.
Before the referendum, the concentration of the political parties was very
low, because of the proportional electoral system, and the corruption very
high (”mani pulite” was not started yet). The political fragmentation and
the instability of government characterizing the period under consideration
(1980 - 1995), let to an increase in the corruption crimes.
In table 3 we used as dependent variable ∆yi,t t h er a t eo fg r o w t ho f
the government expenditure in health (scaled to GDP a n de x p r e s s e da s
percentage) of region i at time t; ∆yi,t(−1) is one period lag of the dependent
variable; the others regressors are those used in the previous regression in
t a b l e2 .W ee s t i m a t es o m ee q u a t i o n s ,w i t hd i ﬀerent regressors. We control
for the rate of growth of the per capita GDP, which is negative and highly
signiﬁcant in every regression. The explanation of this sign is the same as in
table 2: the Italian regions where the rate of growth of the per capita GDP
is higher, the rate of growth of public spending on health is lower.
Even in this set of regressions the sign of the dummy variable MAG is
negative and signiﬁcant.
In equations (3) and (4) the coeﬃcient of the interaction variable MAG∗
∆CONCi,t−1 is not signiﬁcant, then there was not structural break in the
relation between the rate of growth of concentration of votes and the rate
of growth of public spending on health.
In every equation of table 3 the coeﬃcient of ∆CONCi,t−1 is positive.
Remember that this analysis is about proportional electoral system (as the
Italian one until 1993), that is, less concentrated electoral system (the vari-
ation of the concentration of votes in the hands of the political parties was
v e r yl o w ) .I ne q u a t i o n( 6 )w ei n c l u d e d[∆CONCi,t−1]
2, that is negative and
signiﬁcant: the shape of the function of public spending on health with re-
spect to the concentration of votes is an inverted U-shaped function, because
the sign of ∆CONCi,t−1 is positive and the sign of [∆CONCi,t−1]
2 is neg-
ative. Then, we can ﬁnd a level of concentration of votes which maximizes
public spending on health. That is, in this item, the level of public spending
weakely increases with concentration only until a given level of that, after
which it decreases.
The interaction variable MAG∗∆CORRi,t+1 is positive and signiﬁcant
but the variable ∆CORRi,t+1 it is not; there was no relation between the
rate of growth of public spending on health and the rate of growth of the per
capita corruption crimes before 1993; after this date this relation inverted in
positive probably because with ”mani pulite” in some sub-sectors of health
(as medical equipments or advanced hospital facilities) becomes easier to
13collect bribes and maintain them secrets.
Table 4 shows the results of the regressions where the dependent variable
is the rate of growth of the government expenditure in education over GDP.
∆GDPi,t is negative and signiﬁcant; MAG is also negative and signiﬁ-
cant. ∆CONCi,t−1is not signiﬁcant and MAG∗ ∆CONCi,t−1 is negative
and highly signiﬁcant, meaning that before 1993 there has been no relation
between the dependent variable and the rate of growth of concentration of
votes while after 1993 the relation appears and is negative. The variables
∆CORRi,t+1 and MAG∗ ∆CORRi,t+1 are not signiﬁcant: there was no
relation between the rate of growth of public spending on education and
the rate of growth of concentration of votes because education is an area in
which is diﬃcult to collect bribes.
In table 5 the dependent is the rate of growth of public spending in social
services and social securities, two important items of public spending. The
result of the regressions are the same of table 4, and then the interpretation
follows that of public spending on education.
To summarise, we can say that, in Italy, public spending in consump-
tion is linked to the concentration of votes in the hands of political parties
in diﬀerent way depending on electoral system. In proportional electoral
system, where the concentration of votes is very low, public spending in
consumption could be thought as a measure of the eﬃciency of government,
so, if government becomes more stable (and then the votes concentrate in
the hands of less political parties) public spending increases. In majoritarian
electoral system (where votes are concentrated in the hands of few political
parties) instead, an increase of that concentration leads to address public
spending on some key districts or sectors, reducing the rate of growth (of
public spending in consumption) as a whole.
About the link between corruption and public spending in consumption,
we cannot make a precise guess. The results of the analysis, in the Italian
scenario, show that the rate of growth of per capita corruption negatively
aﬀects the rate of growth of public spending in consumption as a whole, and
there is no relation among them in the items as public spending on health
(at least until 1993), education and social services and securities, probably
because in those sectors it is diﬃcult to collect bribes and maintain them
secrets.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
From 1993 the italian electoral system swiched from proportional to majori-
tarian, leading to a mixed electoral system. Moreover, in those years, there
was been ”mani pulite”, a campaign against corruption that changed the
corruption increasing trend from 1980 to 1993. We have investigated the
impact of these two events on the size of public spending in cosumption,
14as a whole, in the ﬁrst part of the analysis, and divided in some items, in
the second part. We used a regional panel data, and the results show that
public spending in consumption is linked to the concentration of votes in
the hands of political parties in diﬀerent way depending on electoral sys-
tem: under proportional system the relation among them is positive, under
majoritarian electoral system it becomes negative. About corruption it is
not possible to make a precise guess; referring to the items composing public
spending in consumption, the relation is negative because those are sectors
in which it is diﬃcult to collect bribes and maintain them secrets. while
corruption seams to have a negative impact on the rate of growth of public
spending in consumption, due to the nature of items conposing the macro
aggregate.
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